Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China has started making noteworthy statements about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:

China's foreign minister Wang Yi called Russia's security concerns "legitimate", saying they should be "taken seriously and addressed."

Chinese ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun went further and said outright that China disagreed with US claims that Russia was threatening international peace. He also criticised the US for convening a meeting of the UN Security Council, likening it to "megaphone diplomacy" that was "not conducive" for negotiations.

According to the Economist, China’s relations with Russia are the strongest they have been for 70 years. Thus we ask:

Will China get involved in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict by 2024?

This question will resolve positively if between March 1, 2022 and December 31, 2023, representatives of China announce or acknowledge the Chinese involvement in the conflict. By the Chinese involvement we mean a situation where China supports one of the parties in the conflict, either by military presence on Ukrainian territory or by military material aid of any value.

Purely commercial transactions (including weapon sales) between Chinese suppliers (be they private or state-owned companies) and one side of the conflict will be counted only if they are openly supported, endorsed, organized or subsidized by the Chinese government. Dual-use material aid will be counted only if provided with the stated purpose of helping one side's efforts in the conflict (as opposed to e.g. civilian relief).

Clarification issued on March 3, 2023: To count as "openly supported, endorsed, organized or subsidized" the government of China must officially announce material aid to one side of the conflict. Approval of a commercial arms deal does not qualify, unless it were to be accompanied by either an official statement describing the deal as supporting one side of the conflict or the government of China sharing some of the material cost of the deal.