The Israel-Hamas war and its broader implications are extremely challenging and grim to forecast. The long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides insights for what to expect, but the scale and barbarity of the attacks and massacres by Hamas on the 7th of October were so far beyond what Israel has experienced, that past responses against Hamas should only be loosely used as a starting point. Typically, in the back and forth between Israel and Hamas, each side would antagonize each other until Hamas passed a threshold where Israel would launch an incursion into Gaza. After most of Israel’s objectives had been reached and too many images of tragedy and suffering changed public opinion, pressure would mount until Israel would withdraw its troops. This cycle has continued since Hamas took control in Gaza in 2007. 

This time Netanyahu has stated that every Hamas member “is a dead man.” Others have said that Gaza will be leveled. While both statements are hyperbole, they capture the anger and resolve that is likely to lead Israel to accept unprecedented losses among their own troops as well as show little constraint to eliminate Hamas in Gaza. Gaza is one of the most densely populated places on earth and has a vast tunnel network. Hamas does not fight from military bases, but instead has always blended into the civilian population, increasing civilian (collateral) deaths, to eventually turn world sentiment against Israel. Israel will remain united during the first several months of this conflict. 

Neither side has another place to call home and the distances are so small that a buffer zone is nearly meaningless in an age of rockets and missiles. This will make de-escalation far more difficult. 

**My forecasts and rationales follow:** 

  


**My forecast: 40%**

Israel will start in Northern Gaza. The extensive system of tunnels and the difficulty of urban warfare, even after extensive bombing will make this a most difficult challenge. Civilians will remain in the area, complicating the assault. Rubble makes great hiding places. Examples to understand the difficulty of this sort of operation include Mosul, Grozny, and Mariupol. None of those operations had the number of troops and firepower focused on them, but they also didn’t have as extensive a network of defenses and tunnels built over decades. 

**My forecast that Hamas loses control of Gaza within 9 months is closer to 85%.** 

This is not a question of capability or will on behalf of Israel, but of time. The 17th of October attack on the Al Ahli Arab Hospital, allegedly killed hundreds of civilians, was originally attributed to Israel, but now appears likely to have been the result of an errant missile fired by Palestinian militants. (This story is still very much developing.) A succession of massive humanitarian tragedies such as the hospital attack, if attributed to Israel, could destroy Western support for Israel's attempt to eliminate Hamas. Hamas know this and will fight in a way to maximize Israeli mistakes and attacks on civilians and humanitarian services.

  


**My forecast: 37%**

This is an extremely high forecast considering that historically Iran and Israel have avoided direct confrontation. The only time I can recall Iran directly striking Israel was during the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 when Iran launched SCUD missiles at Israel and the US put pressure on Israel not to respond, to prevent a wider conflict. There is a virtual certainty that Israel will continue the war against Gaza. With Iran so explicitly part of the conflict in funding, providing weapons, and now publicly directing its allies to attack Israel, it will be difficult for Israel to leave Iran untouched, but they haven't made a case for it so far and are likely to be trying to keep Hezbollah out of the war. If Hezbollah commits to a full attack of Israel, the probability of Israel attacking Iran with airstrikes will rise significantly. The US is unlikely to try and restrain Israel from a decisive war in Gaza, though they will continue to push for adherence to the rules of war and provision of some humanitarian relief. I don’t see a real possibility of an invasion of Iran. 

  


**My forecast: 85%, and 60% in the next three months**

I am much more interested if there will be an Israel-Hezbollah war in the next month because it will complicate Israel’s moves to destroy Hamas and may also draw US airpower into the fight. Hezbollah reportedly has ~150,000 rockets and missiles, including some with a range to hit most of Israel. The Iron Dome system is quite effective but there isn’t a limitless supply of interceptors. An attack by Hezbollah may also draw Syria into the conflict and make it more likely for a direct confrontation with Iran. A broader war will also be felt throughout Europe with anti-Israel protests as well as protests against governments throughout Western Europe. The foreign minister of Iran announced that “the rest of the axis” against Israel, which includes Hezbollah will respond if the crimes against Palestinians continue. 

This did not materialize in the immediate aftermath of the Al Ahli Arab Hospital. Whether this is because Hezbollah got word that the attack was not from Israel, did not meet their threshold for involvement, or have tempered their resolve in the face of a massive US military presence in the area, is for now an unknown. 

Looking beyond the current Gaza war to 2030 is a challenge because the results of this conflict will reshape the military and political landscape. In an upcoming article, I will explore scenarios for how the Middle East will look after the Israel Gaza war concludes, and it will affect Hezbollah if they stay on the sidelines of the current conflict.

  


**My forecast: 4%**

This war will make it nearly impossible by 2025 for Arab and Muslim countries to establish normal relations with Israel. Even if the leaders are pragmatic businesspeople, they will face great pressure from the streets not openly interact with Israel. The war in Gaza will be shockingly brutal. This is an area where Iran has achieved a major goal through its proxies, thwarting the attempts by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the US to establish closer relations. 

  


**My forecast: 7%**

Egypt traditionally is the second largest recipient of military aid in the world (exception now due to Ukraine). The government of Egypt may feel some sympathy for Palestinians in Gaza but doesn’t want them crossing their border. The economy of Egypt is weak. They are not close with Israel. I’m not at 0 because war is unpredictable, an attempted mass exodus from Gaza could strain relations, Israel’s attempts to secure the border with Egypt may result in conflict with Egypt that spirals out of control, and/or if Israel’s assault on Gaza goes wildly out of control, pressure may mount on Egypt to intervene. 



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Providing forecasts and analysis on such a fast moving and unprecedented conflict should encourage humility in thinking understand what will unfold. I read as much as possible from differing perspectives, pay attention to great forecasting sites such as Metaculus, Good Judgment, Infer, and SwiftCentre, reach out to people with knowledge of the region and of diplomacy and war, and update constantly. 

Knowledge and understanding of how Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the US, the EU, China, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria all have interests, alliances, and grievances, should be factored into how the war will proceed. Some of the quantitative tools and algorithms that serve forecasters well, and where AI may excel, are not very applicable in this conflict, if they look at past Israeli/Palestinian conflicts. Studying the challenges of urban combat and fighting in places like Fallujah, and Mosul give a glimpse of the complexity and devastation of this war.