On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine along a front some 1,000 miles long, with maximalist objectives. The initial attacks conquered wide swathes of territory but Russia proved unable to hold and exploit its gains in the face of fierce Ukrainian resistance. As of October 2022, heavy fighting continued, and Russia has recently declared a partial mobilization, apparently intending to throw manpower at its problems.
As of October 2022, the Metaculus community gave a 90+% chance of over 100,000 deaths from the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Will more than 150,000 people be killed in the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022?
This question will resolve as Yes if more than 150,000 people die in the Russo-Ukrainian War during 2022. Deaths may include civilian and military casualties, and should count deaths whose primary cause was from combat with opposing forces. If other countries become involved in this conflict then deaths involving those countries will be included. This question will resolve based on information available on March 1, 2023.
To determine the number of deaths, Metaculus will consider the best available credible sources using their best judgment. Measures must be taken to avoid double-counting if estimates from multiple sources are combined.
"Killed in the war" means anyone killed anywhere in any armed attack that is predominantly connected to the Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as war-related operational losses from causes like soldiers run over and killed by military trucks, accidental explosions at wartime ammo depots, etc, so long as such operational losses are predominantly connected to the operating conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It also includes Ukrainians (and Russians, if any) killed by opposing occupation forces in lethal repressions or excesses predominantly connected to the war its attendant occupation regimes. It does not include lethal domestic repressions, even if the victims may have considered themselves to be properly nationals of the other side. It does not include all excess deaths attributable to the war, but is limited to violent killings and operational losses due to wartime conditions. (For example, a documented increase in suicide rates due to the despair and dislocation of war would not affect the count, but a documented increase in traffic fatalities due to wartime operational stresses among personnel serving in-theater probably would.)
Should the war expand to include more countries, or even spiral into a general world conflagration no longer predominantly centered on Ukraine, all victims killed everywhere will still be counted for question purposes.