This is a quickly written, rough post intended to provide context for several questions in the [Nuclear Risk Forecasting Tournament](https://www.metaculus.com/tournament/nuclear-risk-forecasting-tournament/). 

Comments are very welcome, and could inform what I write in some associated research outputs!

**Relevant questions**



* [How many staff will the Arms Control Association, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and Ploughshares Fund have at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8132/staff-at-nuclear-risk-organizations/)
* [What will be the total size of MacArthur's 2022 and 2023 Nuclear Challenges grants?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8133/macarthur-challenge-grants/)
* [What will be the total size of Open Philanthropy's 2022 grants in the nuclear risk area?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8551/open-philanthropys-2022-nuclear-risk-grants/)
* [Will a donor other than Carnegie or MacArthur make >$10m of nuclear risk related grants in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8553/donor-giving-10m-of-nuclear-risk-in-2022/)
* [How many staff at EA orgs other than ALLFED will be primarily focused on nuclear risk in December 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8552/ea-orgs-focused-on-nuclear-risk-in-dec-2022/)


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Several of the largest philanthropic funders of work related to nuclear risk have stopped or reduced their funding for such work or will do so soon. This apparently includes the Compton Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Hewlett Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, Skoll Foundation, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation ([Bender, 2021](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/19/washington-arms-controllers-nuclear-weapons-500126); [MacArthur Foundation, 2021](https://www.macfound.org/programs/nuclear/strategy); [ORS Impact, 2015](https://hewlett.org/library/the-william-and-flora-hewlett-foundations-nuclear-security-initiative-findings-from-a-summative-evaluation/); [Wilson, 2021](https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/561786-why-nuclear-arms-control-is-dead)).[1] MacArthur’s plans to leave the space are especially notable, as it had been [one of the largest philanthropic funders in this space](https://peaceandsecurityindex.org/year/2018/issues/nuclear-issues/).

The plausible or likely effects of this include:



* Various projects (organisations, training programs, campaigns, etc.) in this space having to shut down or scale back
* People finding it hard to start or scale up projects in this space
* Some projects in this space being more open than usual to adopting the focuses, approaches, etc. funders request 
* Some projects in this space becoming more focused on non-nuclear issues (e.g., doing projects framed as being about the intersection of nuclear risk and either climate change or social justice, to appeal to new funders)

This could create a window of opportunity in which increased funding to the nuclear risk area is unusually impactful. This is both because it may increase the number of “low-hanging fruit” available (e.g., opportunities to “save” orgs that are already established) and because it may increase funders’ ability to influence the activities and priorities of the funded projects and the space as a whole. 

But how much, if at all, will overall funding to the area decline - perhaps other funders will also scale back or pull out, or perhaps other funders will scale up or enter the space? How long will these effects last? How will this _actually_ affect the operations of various organizations and projects?

The Nuclear Risk Tournament includes several forecasting questions intended to shed light on these matters and thereby inform potential funders and other decision-makers. Forecasts from these questions will likely be incorporated into a writeup on “How much EA funding and labor goes to nuclear risk reduction?” (draft [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KiNLb3eKIZBAz3lGpkuOJM4kskQWuGYKqcDwW1rrpnY/edit#)), a proposal for someone to research “How should EAs react to funders pulling out of the nuclear risk space?” (draft [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_4XTKOytSIm4q--BH3cK8R7Yg7K-KbydKtPLTJJ90I/edit#heading=h.4xdojjltk5de)), and maybe a possible writeup on “Estimating [non-EA] philanthropic funding for nuclear risk reduction”.  

What follows are some additional excerpts from the above-mentioned research proposal, some of which may be relevant for forecasting on this series of questions or if a Metaculus user is interested in themselves producing some research on this topic:

**Research proposal: How should EAs react to funders pulling out of the nuclear risk space?**

Questions related to this topic could be tackled via activities such as:



* Reading what’s being said about these changes by the funders who are pulling out of the space, by funders who will continue to fund in this space, by the affected organizations, and by commentators
    * One could look for what they’re saying in their own reports (e.g., [MacArthur, 2020](https://www.macfound.org/press/evaluation/nuclear-challenges-big-bet-2020-evaluation-report)), in reports they commissioned (e.g., [ORS Impacts, 2015](https://hewlett.org/library/the-william-and-flora-hewlett-foundations-nuclear-security-initiative-findings-from-a-summative-evaluation/)), in the news, etc.
* Talking to people from these institutions
* Making forecasts or putting relevant questions on Metaculus
* Talking to EA funders or other funders about pros, cons, and best practices for trying to influence what funders do  
* Attempting an [impact assessment of various organizations, programmes, movements, etc.](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_4XTKOytSIm4q--BH3cK8R7Yg7K-KbydKtPLTJJ90I/edit#heading=h.qp4yiol3q4ka)

_Why might this research be useful?_

Depending on what precise sub-questions one focuses on, I think a well-executed 2-9 month version of this project would have a decent chance (>10%) of either or both of:



* Convincingly indicating that EA funders should be spending an additional $3m-$25m in this space over the next 5 years than they’d otherwise think
* Convincingly indicating that specific funding opportunities totalling $0.5m-$5m are worth investigation by EA funders and are >25% likely to be worth funding (with these being opportunities that probably wouldn’t have been funded otherwise)

(Those specific numbers shouldn’t be treated as well-calibrated forecasts; they were made up pretty quickly just as an attempt to more clearly communicate my fuzzy, tentative beliefs.)

_What sort of person might be a good fit for this?_

I expect any good generalist researcher could provide a useful analysis of these questions. I expect someone to be a stronger fit the more of the following criteria they meet:



* Knowledge, experience, or connections relevant to the think tank, arms control, policymaking, and/or foundation worlds, especially in relation to Washington D.C. and nuclear risk
* Grantmaking experience
* Trust from EA funders (so they are more likely to act on the person's analysis)

**See also**

["How much EA funding and labor goes to nuclear risk reduction? [draft]"](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KiNLb3eKIZBAz3lGpkuOJM4kskQWuGYKqcDwW1rrpnY/edit#)

**Footnotes**

[1] I haven’t independently verified that this is true of any of these specific funders except Hewlett and MacArthur. Instead, the other funders I name are based entirely on the two cited news sources (which don’t themselves cite sources for the relevant claims).